This Web Appendix contains a roadmap for all additional models and tests supporting the robustness of our results. The following paragraphs provide some background about these analyses to facilitate navigation through the various tables and figures.
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Web Appendix A: Robustness of Brand Performance Measurement Model
There is a large variance shared among the brand rating indicators and the dispersion indicators. These findings are stable across brands and within brands over time. For example, results of a principal component analysis using pooled brand-level standardized and yearly aggregated indicator scores show that with one exception (employer reputation in the US) the factor structure remains stable and fit criteria (loadings, communalities, variances extracted) are equally sufficient (see Table A1 ). Similarly, loadings suggest a two-factor structure if we apply PCA for each brand separately (see Table A1 ). In summary, we rely on a two-factor structure throughout all our analyses performed. 
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Web Appendix B: Analysis of Various Model Variants
We re-estimated our model by using various samples and by adapting the model to control for various biases potentially confounding our results. First, given the amount of parameters to be estimated per VAR model (number of endogenous variables multiplied by number of lags plus number of period dummies), we decided to limit the minimum number of observations per time series to 500 to get more reliable estimates. However, about 100 observations are usually sufficient to estimate each model. Thus, we were able to increase sample to 772,784 firm-brand-day observations. Table B1 reports results for Granger noncausality tests. We adjusted α-levels by Bonferroni correction. Further, we report the percentage of number of tests across 20 lags that reject the null of non-causality at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level (see Figure B1 ). We also tested 5, 10, and 15 lags. Applying the conservative Bonferroni-corrected significance levels, we find similar results. Only the brand ratingidiosyncratic risk link appears to be weaker for shorter lags. Second, we added brand awareness as additional endogenous variable to our VAR specification given some of the dispersion effects might be confounded by brand awareness effects. YouGov data includes a separate indicator measuring whether the respondents have heard anything positive/negative about a brand. We use this indicator and calculate a proxy for brand awareness, which we calculated as the sum of positive and negative votes divided by total number of votes. Granger non-causality test results reveal that both variables are indeed interrelated (see Table B1 ). Accordingly, we adapted our VAR model: 
Results are robust concerning the main effect of dispersion on return and risk. Further, the interaction effect of rating*dispersion on risk remain stable (see Table B2 ). To control for potential biases caused by high standard errors of estimates we follow Srinivasan et al. (2004) and Bezawada and Pauwels (2013) and apply weighted least squares. Concretely, we weighted the elasticities by the inverse of their standard errors. We applied this weighting procedure to also all second stage regressions (see Web Appendix G). Alternatively, dynamic linear model can be used to estimate all in one stage (Ataman, Van Heerde, and Mela 2010). 
The null hypotheses assume that the variables shown in the first column do not Granger cause the variables shown in the first row. Rat.*Disp. Notes: * p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests). Total number of firm-brand-day observations is 772,784; Average effects from the VAR models and impulse response functions are shown. Individual effects are aggregated using a multilevel model with cluster-robust standard errors (brands are nested within firms). Further, brand-level observations respectively firm-level observations are weighted by the inverse of standard errors of effects (for a similar approach in Srinivasan et al. 2004 ).
Brand rating
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We have two approaches to deal with measurement error, although all surveys have the inherent error. First, YouGov data measure brand perception indicators independently across respondents. That is, any respondent is asked about his perception (most confident perception and feel most comfortable to do the survey) of only one indicator for a particular sector, not all six indicators. This procedure reduces measurement error which would exist if respondents answer all indicators. Also, for any industry sector, the respondents first select all brands for which they agree to the positive question for each brand indicator, then they select all brands for which they agree to the negative one. Hence, no measure error in terms of double counting and human errors; computer forces the answers to be either positive or negative, but not both. Moreover, results might be biased by the 'noise' of day-to-day measurement error. To rule out this effect, we applied a filter technique to smooth the time series. In particular, we used the Hodrick-Prescott filter method (Hodrick and Prescott 1997) . Basically, this method separates the trend component from a cyclical component. Originally, such filter techniques were used to identify business cycles in times series data. However, econometricians use such techniques also to 'denoise' high frequency time series data. In our scenario, the cyclical component ('noise') can be assumed to be the measurement error while the trend component ('denoised data') is assumed to measure non-random changes. Technically, the Hodrick-Prescott filter computes the linear trend (smoothed series) s of y by minimizing the variance of y around s, subject to a penalty that constrains the second difference of s. That is, the filter chooses the smoothed series s to minimize:
The penalty parameter λ controls the smoothness of the series. The larger λ, the smoother is the trend component. Following the recommendation of Hodrick and Prescott, we chose λ = 100. Figure  C1 shows the trend and cyclical component for brand rating of Starbucks. Applying the VAR model to the smoothed time series, we find that brand dispersions' cumulative effects (10 days) on return and risk remain stable (see Table C1 ). However, immediate effects disappear. But, this is a drawback of smoothing filters: such filters use observations nearby a particular date (here: day) to smooth the series. Therefore, short-term effects may be obscured by smoothing.
Figure C1: Application of Hodrick-Prescott filter (λ = 100) to smooth time series data
Notes: Exemplary time series: brand rating of Starbucks. 'Brand rating' is the original time series (bold grey line on the top). 'Cycle' (the grey line on the bottom) represents the assumed measurement error. 'Trend' (black line) is the resulting nonrandom part assumed to capture non-random changes in brand rating. Notes: * p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests). Total number of firm-brand-day observations is 772,784 Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott 1997) applied to smooth brand performance time series.
Web Appendix D: Brand Dispersion's Impact on Trading Volume
We expect brand dispersion to increase trading volume. 1 Increasing divergence and disagreement of brand judgments amongst consumers as proxied by brand dispersion would lead to differing assessments of the brand asset's value. Some investors may believe the firm's future value is greater, while others may perceive the opposite due to the divergent judgments across consumers. Trading volume is directly related to such differences (positive or negative) in the opinions, as individual traders seek to exploit their perceived information advantage (Chae 2005) . That is, higher dispersion would boost the likelihood of arbitrage and hedging with higher trading volume. 1 Per an anonymous reviewer, the effect of brand rating on trading volume can be quite counterintuitive. It can be negative because there are more arbitrage opportunities for brands with lower average ratings. But, at the same time one could argue the other way around: brands with higher brand rating are traded more as they tend to have more profitable futures and are a relatively safe egg in the investment basket. In addition, we surmise that institutional investors might be more sensitive to brand dispersion and brand rating than individual investors, as institutional investors would have more resources to monitor (and respond to) such brand changes. 2 Also, higher dispersion may reflect deteriorating prospects for the brand, which may catch investors' attention and thus motivate investors to trade their shares (Fiske 1980; Post and Levy 2005) .
Web Appendix E: Model Specification
Granger causality tests Table E1 shows the results for the various Granger causality tests. We report the minimum pvalues across twenty lags (Trusov, Bucklin, and Pauwels 2009) . Results of pairwise Granger causality tests show that brand dispersion and rating are relevant for understating the dynamics in stock market performance. The null hypotheses assume that the variables shown in the first column do not Granger cause the variables shown in the first row. Results suggest that both brand dispersion and brand rating Granger cause abnormal stock return (p < .05) and idiosyncratic risk (p < .01). The interaction term of brand dispersion and rating Granger causes risk and weakly Granger causes abnormal returns (p < .10). Controlling for the number of tests performed (we tested twenty lags), we apply the conservative Bonferroni-correction of significance levels (Bonferroni = α / number of tests). We find that dispersion is still Granger causing idiosyncratic risk (p < .0005). Table F1 provides the results of an ANOVA on the cell means depicted in Figure 3 . For return, the benefits of brand rating enhancements are reduced when dispersion increases (p < .10), with a maximal benefit between increasing rating-decreasing dispersion vs. decreasing rating-increasing dispersion. The difference between these scenarios (.096) is significantly different from zero (p < .01). Similarly, when dispersion increases, the benefits of brand rating in reducing risk are diminished dramatically. The difference for both scenarios (.169) is significantly different from zero (p < .01). Further, increasing dispersion may help to diminish the effect of decreasing rating on risk: the mean difference (.114) is significantly different from zero (p < .05). Literature suggests the importance of exploring potential sources for within and across industry heterogeneity (Anderson et al. 2004; Mizik and Jacobson 2008) . This is important because, for example, preconditions may differ across industries affecting the relative predictive power of brand metrics (Morgan and Rego 2006) . For example, brand differentiation can become more important in industries with commoditized goods and services (Mizik and Jacobson 2008) . These authors suggest various significant drivers of elasticities of brand ratings, including firm size, leverage, industry maturity, competition, and firm conduct (strategy and implementation). Given the richness of the database, we now explore the nature of heterogeneity within and across industries, firms, and brand covariates. Table G1 provides descriptive statistics across industries. Figure G1 depicts the cumulative impact of brand dispersion on return (first chart) and risk (second chart), ordered by effect sizes. Industry sample sizes range from 14 (utilities) to 164 (food and beverage). The results indicate a large amount of heterogeneity. Specifically, concerning the impact of brand dispersion on return, we find banks and financial services, utilities, media and entertainment, telecommunications, and retail sectors have a more negative association between brand dispersion and return. We surmise that what is interesting, and could be a source of explanation, is that these effects are strongest in industries with wide customer bases. Everyone seems to use banks, utilities, phone, and TV. Also, the risk-mitigation effects of dispersion are largest for utilities, travel and leisure, food and beverage, oil and gas, and industrial goods sectors. We find the strongest positive impact of brand dispersion on volume for banks and financial services, insurance, retail, oil and gas, as well as airline sectors. Figures G2 and G3 summarize the cumulative impact of brand rating and its interaction with brand dispersion by industries. Note: Brand metrics are scaled (so the values can be comparable across brands). For brand rating, the minimum possible value is -1; the maximum possible value is +1. For brand dispersion, the minimum possible value is 0; the maximum possible value is +1. et al. (2004) and Bezawada and Pauwels (2013) and apply weighted least squares. Concretely, we weighted the elasticities by the inverse of their standard errors. We applied this weighting procedure to all second stage regressions (see Table G2 ). Further, we centered all metric independent variables and applied multilevel modeling technique with cluster-robust standard errors because brands are nested within firms and firms are nested within industry.
O
The dependent variable in second stage regressions is the VAR estimate for each immediate and cumulative effects of brand dispersion, rating, and the interaction on stock market performance. The independent variables are the brand-, firm-, and industry-level covariates. Note that this second-stage regression is only cross-sectional and does not vary over time. This is because many of the independent variables do not change over time (e.g., industry classification, brand strategies, and segments). Also, variables such as ROA, leverage, and assets do not change at the daily level (reported only quarterly and unavailable at daily level, Tirunillai and Tellis 2012). Thus, in the second stage regression, we entered the independent variables such as ROA, leverage, and assets as averages for the sample period (2008 to 2011), while other cross-sectional variables such as industry classification, brand strategies, and segments do not need to be averaged. The sample size is 1,097 (due to the missing observations) in the stage-two regressions. The model is: Table G2 reports results for these follow-up 2 nd stage regressions. If we include brand awareness as additional control variable in stage one VAR models, results do not change. Overall, the models appear to have low fitness because the R² of all models is usually less than 11%. This is not that surprising because there are no time variations in the predicting variables, while the dependent variables are based on time variation with daily data. As shown in Table G2 , most of the variables are not significant except for several cases. Among the industry, firm-, and brand-level covariates, we find few significant sources of the results heterogeneity. That is, some variables such as ROA (.038; p < .01) and ln(Total assets) (.002; p < .10) can positively affect the cumulative impact of the interaction between brand rating and dispersion on abnormal returns (Mizik and Jacobson 2008) . This may be due to other factors' ability to affect investors' confidence. Notes: * p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 (standard errors in parenthesis; all metric independent variables grand-mean centered) Multilevel models with cluster-robust standard errors (brands are nested within firms). Further, brand-level observations respectively firm-level observations are weighted by the inverse of standard errors of effects (for a similar approach cp. Srinivasan et al. 2004 and Bezawada and Pauwels 2013) ; all models include dummy variables for industries, country of origin, and country coverage
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To analyze whether our results hold also for longer time periods, we aggregated the data to a monthly level. Since monthly data aggregation reduces the number of time series observations per brand in our sample to a maximum of 43 months, we estimated a model using monthly first differences of financial and brand performance variables. We augmented this model with various control variables including profitability, cash flow, market share, total assets, analyst coverage, analyst recommendations, percentage of strategic stock holdings, and industry competition. Since Granger causality tests suggest that financial performance variables are interrelated, we add abnormal return, idiosyncratic risk, and trading volume as additional control variables. All model variables have been adjusted by monthly industry means. Given the nested data structure (periods are nested within brands, brands are nested within firms, and firms are nested within industries), we applied multilevel modeling technique. We find that, main effects of dispersion remain stable (see Table H1 ). For each month, dependent and independent variables are adjusted by industry means (except for industry competition).
